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ROBINSON v. RUNYON
149 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 1998)
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Aleia Robinson worked for the
United States Postal Service ( "Postal
Service") at the Cincinnati, Ohio Bulk
Mail Center ("CBMC") from 1986 until
January 1992 as a keyer clerk.' During
that time, Robinson was never disciplined
and was considered an excellent
employee.2 On January 26, 1992, as
Robinson drove her car into the icy
CBMC driveway, the car slid out of
control and struck a utility pole.3
Although Robinson was traveling at the
posted speed limit of 25 mph when the
accident occurred, the police officer who
examined the scene of the accident
estimated Robinson's speed at 55 mph.4
The officer also noted abnormal road
conditions.'
The Postal Service Labor
Relations Manual requires managers and
supervisors to investigate all accidents
promptly to determine their cause.6 In the
investigation, supervisors are required to
inspect the accident site and interview
witnesses and employees.7 Discipline is
imposed only after the supervisor
conducts a thorough investigation, giving
consideration to the past work record of
the employee, allowing the employee an
opportunity to explain his version of the
incident, and finding just cause.
8
Two Postal Service safety officers
preliminarily concluded from their
examination of Robinson's car that the
accident resulted from excessive speed.9
After reading the police report, the safety
officers again concluded that the accident
resulted from excessive speed.10 The
safety officers recommended Robinson's
termination to both her immediate
supervisor and her second line
supervisor." Both supervisors agreed
with the recommendation and forwarded a
termination request to the General
Supervisor, who also agreed that
Robinson should be terminated.12 None of
the supervisors conducted the required
investigation of the incident.13  On
February 10, 1992, Robinson received
notification that she was being terminated
for the incident. 4
Robinson challenged her discharge
through her union. 5  A subsequent
investigation revealed that the police
officer had incorrectly calculated
Robinson's speed and that she had been
traveling at a speed far less than 55 mph.16
It also revealed that the police officer had
noted road conditions as "other" on the
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7rd.
81d.








police report because of ice and water on
the driveway. 7 Pursuant to a settlement
agreement between the Postal Service and
the union, Robinson returned to her job
and received back pay for the ten weeks
after her termination.'8  Robinson
exhausted her administrative remedies
under Title VII 9 and filed suit against the
Postal Service seeking damages of
$750,000.20 She alleged $250,000 in
compensatory damages for emotional
distress, mental distress, anguish and
humiliation.2 She alleged $500,000 in
punitive damages due to racist, disparate
treatment from the Postal Service's
management.22
Prior to the trial, the magistrate
judge held that as a governmental agency
the Postal Service could not be found
liable for punitive damages under Title
VII.23 Additionally, the Postal Service
filed a motion in limine requesting that
two items be excluded from evidence
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.24
The first was a N Employment
Application.25  This was an offensive
17Id.
18 .1d.
19 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (West
1998).
2 Robinson, 149 F.3d at 510-11.
211d. at 510.
2 id. at 510-11.
23Id. at 516.
24FED. R. EVID. 403 states:
Althoughrelevant, evidence maybe excluded ifits
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence. See
Robinson, 149 F.3d at 511.
2 Robinson, 149 F.3d at 511.
parody of normal applications. Typical of
its content was the proffered responses for
place of birth: "zoo, cotton field, back
alley and animal hospital."26 It had been
circulated throughout the office and
brought to the attention of supervisors.
27
The second was a picture of a hangman's
noose that a white employee had drawn
and displayed to an African-American
employee.28 Granting the motion in
limine, the magistrate judge decided that
the pieces of evidence were irrelevant and
without sufficient probative value to
outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice
posed by their introduction into
evidence.29
An all-white jury found for the
Postal Service.3" Thereafter, Robinson
appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.3'
HOLDING
The Sixth Circuit reversed the
district court's decision and remanded the
case for anew trial.32 The court found that
the district court erred by not admitting
the parody application as tending to show
that supervisors tolerated a racially hostile
atmosphere at the CBMC prior to the
incident in issue, and its exclusion was an
abuse of discretion.33
ANALYSIS
Robinson appealed on three
26 /d. at 511 n.5.
27 Id. at 511.
28 Id.
29 Id.
3 Id. at 512.
3 1 id.
32 Id. at 517.
33 Id. at 515.
grounds. First, Robinson took exception
to the pretrial exclusion of the application
and the picture.34 Second, Robinson took
exception to the district court's refusal to
instruct the jury to consider punitive
damages because of the Postal Service's
sovereign immunity." Third, Robinson
claimed that bias was involved in the
selection of the all-white jury that
considered her case.
36
The court began its examination of
the excluded evidence by setting out the
standards with which the Sixth Circuit
reviews the evidentiary decisions of a
district court.37 Proffered evidence is
reviewed on the grounds ofits relevancy.38
The district court also balances the
probative value of the evidence against
any potentially unfair prejudicial impact
the evidence might have.39 The Sixth
Circuit reviews evidence in a manner
which most favors the proponent of that
evidence.40  The evidence is given its
maximum probative value and its least
reasonable prejudicial force.4 A district
court has abused its discretion only when
the Sixth Circuit is firmly convinced that
the lower court judge has made a
34 Id. at 511.
351Id. at 515-16.
36 The court declined to address this issue because
it was not raised in the district court. Id. at 517.
37 Id. at 512.
38 FED. R. EvID. 401 states:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.
39 Robinson, 149 F.3d at 512.
4 ld. (citing United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701,
714 (6th Cir. 1996)).
41Id.
mistake.42
Next, the court explained the
standard for the admission of evidence.43
Evidence which tends to make the
existence of a fact more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence is
relevant.' A court may not "consider the
weight or sufficiency of the evidence" and
"may not exclude the evidence if it has
even the slightest probative worth. '45 The
fact that a piece of evidence may not
prove a case alone and may require the
jury to draw inferences does not make it
any less relevant.46
Relying on holdings from the First,
Fifth and Eighth Circuits, the court held
that circumstantial evidence which reveals
an employer's unflattering history in
employment practices is admissible to
show a racially hostile atmosphere even if
it may otherwise be unfairly prejudicial.47
Such evidence is critical for a jury's
assessment of whether the employer's
action was undertaken because of an
unlawful motive.48 The court recognized
that intentional discrimination is often
difficult to prove without relying
significantly on circumstantial evidence
because defendants are not likely to
openly proclaim their racial animus.49
In reversing the district court's
decision regarding the admissibility of the
42 Id. (citing Schrand v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co.,
851 F.2d 152, 157 (6th Cir.1988)).
431Id. at 512.
44 Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 401).
451 Id. (quoting Douglass v. Eaton Corp., 956 F.2d
1339, 1344 (6th Cir. 1992)).
46 Robinson, 149 F.3d at 514.
471Id. at 512.
481 Id. at 513 (citing Estes v. Dick Smith, Ford Inc.,
856 F.2d 1097, 1103 (8th Cir.1988)).
49Robinson, 149 F.3d at 513.
parody application, the Sixth Circuit
found two factors probative." First, at
least one of the supervisors involved in the
decision to terminate Robinson may have
been aware of the parody application and
done nothing to thwart its dissemination."
The court rejected the Postal Service's
argument that the application should be
excluded because Robinson failed to show
that all the supervisors involved in her
firing knew of the parody applica-
tion. 52 Second, the parody application
was specifically present at the office in
which Robinson worked.53 In considering
this factor the court distinguished Schrand
v. Federal Pacific Electric Company,54 in
which evidence was excluded because the
circumstantial evidence arose at a separate
office and involved a manager who was
not involved in terminating the
plaintiff/employee.55 The Robinson court
concluded that at least one supervisor's
knowledge and activity at Robinson's
actual office tended to show that
Robinson's termination was racially
motivated. 6
On the other hand, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision to exclude the noose drawing."
The court found that the connection
between the incident and Robinson's
termination was tenuous for two reasons. 8
First, the noose incident occurred a year
after Robinson's termination.59 Second,
the noose incident was not connected to
any of the supervisors involved in the
decision to terminate Robinson."
After concluding its discussion of
relevancy, the court turned to prejudice as
a factor in determining whether evidence
should be admitted.6 The court stated that
evidence must not be merely prejudicial
but unfairly prejudicial before it can be
excluded.62  Evidence pertaining to
racially discriminatory motives is not
excludable because it is racially
inflammatory. 63 The court stated that "[iut
is axiomatic that the available evidence
provided to establish racial animus may be
racially inflammatory."'  The court
specifically rejected the claim that
admitting such evidence would inject an
emotional element into the case which was
otherwise lacking, causing a decision on
an improper basis. Instead, it stated that
"vigorous cross-examination, presentation
of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of
attacking such evidence.
66
The Sixth Circuit found that the
district court's exclusion of the parody
application was too restrictive and denied
Robinson the ability to present her case
50 Id. at 513-14.
51 Id. at 513.
52 Id. at 514.
53 Id.
54 851 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1988).
51 Robinson, 149 F.3d at 514 (discussing Schrand,
851 F.2d at 156).











'Id. (quoting Doe v. Claiborne County,
Tennessee, 103 F.3d 495, 515 (6th Cir. 1996)).
before the jury.67 Robinson's case relied
heavily upon circumstantial evidence. 68
The court held that as a result the
exclusion of this key piece of evidence
might have made a difference in thejuror's
minds.69 Therefore, the district court's
error was not harmless and Robinson was
entitled to another trial.70
The Sixth Circuit dealt next with
Robinson's argument that the district court
erred in refusing to instruct the jury to
consider punitive damages. Robinson
argued that the Postal Service is a
commercial enterprise not a governmental
agency.71  Robinson also' argued that
Congress' designation of the Postal
Service as a "sue and be sued" agency
overrode the exemption from punitive
damages.72
The Postal Service's status as a
governmental agency is important because
such agencies are exempt from punitive






72 Id. at 516-17.
3 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(1) states:
A complaining party may
recover punitive damages under
this section against a respondent
(other than a government,
government agency or political
subdivision) if the complaining
party demonstrates that the
respondent engaged in a
discriminatory practice or
discriminatory practices with
malice or with reckless
indifference to the federally
protected rights of an aggrieved
found that while the Postal Service has a
commercial-like operation, it functions as
an agency of the federal government.74
The court relied on judicial precedent
from the Ninth Circuit, Seventh Circuit,
Second Circuit, and the United States
District Court for the District of
Columbia.75 It also relied upon Congress'
treatment of the Postal Service as a
government agency in chapter 39 and
chapter 5 of the United States Code.
76
individual. (emphasis added).
74Robinson, 149 F.3d at 516.
7sId.
76 Id. The court explained:
The Postal Service
Reorganization Act states that it
"shall be operated as a basic and
fundamental service providedto
the people by the Government
of the United States, authorized
by the Constitution, created by
Act of Congress, and supported
by the people." 39 U.S.C. §
101(a). Postal Service
employees are treated as federal
employees for purposes of civil
service, 39 U.S.C. § 1001(b),
federal criminal laws, 39 U.S.C.
§ 410(b)(2), veteran's
preference requirements, 5
U.S.C. § 2108, and standards of
suitability, security, and conduct
of federal employees, 39 U.S.C.
§ 410(b)(1). It has uniquely
governmental powers such as
the authority to borrow money
backed by the full faith and
credit of the United States
Government, 39 U.S.C. §
2006(c), the right of eminent
domain, 39 U.S.C. § 401(9),
and the right to negotiate
international postal treaties and
conventions, 39 U.S.C. § 407.
Robinson also claimed that
Congress' designation of the Postal
Service as a "sue and be sued" entity made
it liable for punitive damages under Title
VII.7 7 The court discussed two tests to be
applied in this situation. First, the court
must determine whether Congress waived
sovereign immunity for the agency.7 The
Sixth Circuit rejected Robinson's
arguments and held that the Postal Service
is a governmental entity, and Congress
had not waived the Postal Service's
sovereign immunity.79  Second, the
substantive law upon which the claim is
based must provide the relief sought."0
Because the court had already determined
that the substantive law under Title VII
does not allow punitive damages,
Robinson's argument failed the second
test."' The court explained that "simply
because Congress has provided that an
entity may generally be sued for damages,
does not equate with the presumption that
the particular law under which a plaintiff




The Sixth Circuit articulated a
two-part test for the admission of evidence
tending to show that a termination was
racially motivated. First, the court must
consider relevancy under Federal Rule of
Evidence 401.83 In so doing, it must apply
Id.
77 Robinson, 149 F.3d at 516-17.
781d. at 517.
79 Id. at 516-17.
80 Id.
" Id. at 517.
82 Id.
831d. at 512-14.
a three-part analysis considering locale,
date, and supervisory knowledge. 4 The
evidence must originate at the employee's
particular office. 5 The evidence must
exist at a date prior to the date of
termination. s6  Finally, a supervisor
involved in the termination must have
been aware of what is being offered as
evidence. 7 Second, a court must consider
the possibility of unfair prejudice under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.88
The relevancy section of this test is
tailored solely for the evidence in this
case. Certainly, in other situations the
exceptions in Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) 9 would override the Sixth Circuit's
first two points in its relevancy analysis.
Proof that such incident occurred
previously at another location of the same
organization could clearly establish that
there was an opportunity for this to occur
throughout the organization. It could also
establish the organization's knowledge
that such incidents were occurring. Both
occurrence at another location and at a
date after the termination could be offered
84 Id. at 513-14.
85 Id. at 514.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 513-14.
8 Id. at 514-15.
89 FED. R. EvID. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a
person in order to show action
in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake
or accident.
to prove that there was an absence of
mistake. The Sixth Circuit's failure to
address Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
leaves a gaping hole in its analysis. Many
of the opinions upon which the Sixth
Circuit relied for precedent into ruling
concerning the Postal Service's status in a
governmental agency have allowed
plaintiffs in civil rights cases to use
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). 90 This
seems to indicate that the Sixth Circuit
would allow this use, also, if a case was
properly presented.
Requiring the terminating
supervisor to have actual knowledge of the
prior act being entered into evidence is not
a sound universal principle. In practice, it
provides an incentive for supervisors to be
as ignorant as possible of the work
atmosphere. From a public policy
perspective it would be better to impute
knowledge to supervisors. This would
force supervisors to be proactive. They
would have an incentive to monitor the
work atmosphere and take steps to
improve any problems related to prejudice
that might be occurring.
The Sixth Circuit's analysis was
result oriented. Dissatisfied with the
district court's exclusion of the parody
application, the Sixth Circuit fashioned a
test which mandates the inclusion of the
parody application on remand. Because of
its result oriented handling of the
evidentiary issues, lack of discussion of
possible effects of Federal Rule of
Evidence 404, and lack of consideration of
public policy issues concerning the
admission of evidence, this case is of
limited precedential use for evidentiary
matters. The only strong precedent which
this case stands for is the Postal Service's
continued enjoyment of sovereign
immunity.
Summary and Analysis prepared by:
Ken Lammers
90 See, e.g., Miller v. Poretesky, 595 F.2d 780 (D.
D.C. 1978) (under 404(b) evidence is admissible
to prove a racist motive or intent); Harris v.
Harvey, 605 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979) (under
404(b) the defendant's judicial acts were clearly
admissible as proof of his racially discriminatory
motive); Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting
Corp., 656 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1980) (under
404(b) pre-settlement incidents can be used as
evidence of a continuing pattern of
discrimination); and Wyatt v. Security Inn Food
and Beverage, Inc., 819 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1987)
(evidence is allowed under 404(b) for the purpose
of showing discriminatory intent or motive).
